During WW2, 19,000 Italian volunteers enrolled in the Infantry division of the "Giovani Fascisti": they were not part of the MVSN (Fascist Militia) but were instead a Regular Army unit. These members had been recruited from the GUF (Gioventu’ Universitaria Fascista), a Fascist Party sponsored organization.
One of the fiercest battles done by the Italians in North Africa was the one of the Mareth in southern Tunisia in March 1943. In the Mareth Line the 5,000 soldiers of the "136th Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti" fought bravely alongside the remaining Axis troops. The Division was nearly totally destroyed in 1943, during all the fighting in Tunisia. Even though decimated, the "Giovani Fascisti" was the last Axis military unit to surrender to the Allies in North Africa on May 13, 1943.
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| Giovani Fascisti in the battle |
The following are related excerpts, translated from Benito Mussolini's so-called "Memoirs", originally written as a series of anonymous articles in the pages of Corriere della Sera in the summer of 1944, before being published later that year as a book under the title Storia di un anno: Il tempo del bastone e della carota:
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".....General Messe accepted the task (of holding the Mareth line) though realising its arduous nature; and he left by air for Tunis. Once at his post, he spent the first few weeks in getting the troops into shape both materially and morally; they were, naturally, exhausted, either by their interminable retreat or by their long stay in African territory, a stay which for thousands of soldiers could be reckoned in terms of years. The fate of Tunisia was bound up with supplies. No fewer than three hundred thousand men were concentrated in a small space. The problem of organisation and supplies assumed disquieting dimensions. Naval losses were increasingly heavy. In April alone 120,000 tons of Italian shipping was sunk and a further 50,000 tons was damaged. While the enemy troops were more than well supplied, the Italo-German forces were threatened with mortal anemia.
When the first efforts of the German thrust were spent, having achieved nothing except an extension of the bridgehead, the English went over to the attack along the Mareth line.
In Rome the date of the attack was discussed, and it was thought that Montgomery would delay it in order to profit by the full moon as had been the case at El Alamein. Instead, the English general launched the attack on a pitch dark night. To prevent the artillery mowing down the infantry ahead of them, each soldier wore a white cloth on his back. The Mareth line was strong for some fifteen miles — from the sea to about half its length. The rest was weaker and the last sector almost non-existent; moreover, it was entrusted to the Saharan formations which had reached these positions after a highly exhausting march across the most remote desert trails. These formations, besides, had little artillery and lacked the necessary preparation for meeting the shock of mobile and armoured columns. The Italian troops entrenched on the Mareth line and protected by a broad anti-tank ditch resisted bravely and counter-attacked
The Battle of the Mareth Line was done by the British Eighth Army of General Montgomery in Tunisia, against the Mareth Line held by the Italo-German First Italian Army of General Giovanni Messe. It was the first big operation by the Eighth Army since the Second Battle of El Alameint, that happened in Egypt nearly 5 months previously. The "36th Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti" division was created in 1942, when fought bravely in Libya (Bir el Gobi) and Egypt (Siwa) : the division was in Tunisia in early 1943, after occupying the old Mareth defenses created by the French.
On late March 19, 1943, "Operation Pugilist" -the first British attack- established a bridgehead in the Mareth line but a break-out attempt was defeated on March 21/24 by Axis counter-attacks done mainly the 136th Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti and the XV Panzer Division of the German Wehrmacht.
As a consequente Montgomery did a few days later the "Operation Supercharge II", an outflanking manoeuvre via the Tebaga Gap on March 21 - 26: it was successfully and Messe was forced to writhdraw 64 km back in the Shott area of southern Tunisia.
The Battle of Mareth was preceded a few days before by the "Battle of Medenine", a small counterattack by the famous Rommel.
This battle was unsuccessful and was the last done by the "desert fox" before returning to Germany.
After a full day of fighting, Rommel accepted a suggestion from Messe to end the attack, since it could not be continued without risking losses which would compromise the defence of the Mareth line
On March 19, 1943, XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) of the Eighth Army commenced "Operation Pugilist" (the British code name for the Mareth battle).
The First Italian Army had at its immediate disposal 56 tanks: 29 German and 27 Italian. The German Africa Korps, with the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, and a total of 94 tanks, was in army group reserve. The 21st Panzer Division, which had been moved toward Mareth on 17-18 March to counterattack if necessary in conjunction with the 15th Panzer Division, was not expected to arrive in its assembly area before the morning of the 19th. On the coastal plain of Mareth, Messe had from northeast to southwest--the Italian XX Corps under Generale di Divisione Taddeo Orlando, including the 136th (Young Fascists) Division, commanded by Generale di Divisione Nino Sozzani and the 101st (Trieste) Division under Generale di Brigata Francesco La Ferla (the latter's sector embracing the village of Mareth).
Some 50,000 Germans and 35,000 Italians were in the First Italian Army, according to the highest Allied estimate. Montgomery had 125,000 soldiers -according to Major-General W. Stevens, with 1,481 guns to the Axis's 680, with 623 tanks to the Axis's 139 and with air strength of at least two to one.
According to historian George Howe- the Eighth Army of Montgomery entered the battle for the Mareth Line organized into two regular and one provisional corps: the main attack was to be delivered on a 1,200-yard front close to the seacoast (defended by the "Giovani Fascisti" division) by 30 Corps under General Leese. It would include the British 50th (Northumberland) and 51st (Highland) Divisions, 4th Indian Division, and British 201st Guards Brigade. The third major element of the army, 10 Corps, commanded by General Horrocks, consisted of the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions and 4th Light Armoured Brigade. It was to be held in reserve.
The British opened the main attack on the Mareth Line with an extremely heavy artillery preparation by over 300 guns in the evening of March 19. Howe estimated that 20,000 rounds fell in the Young Fascists sector, nearest the coast, and about 16,000 rounds in the 90th Light Africa Division's area farther west.
It was a clear defeat for Montgomery but his armament superiority soon changed the temporary tactical defeat in a victory, thanks to a flanking maneuver on the Tebaga Gap.
On the March 19, 1943 the Division was holding the Northern (Coastal) section of the Mareth Line and had a combat strength of 5000 men.
Two months later, when surrendering -on May 13- as the last Axis troops still fighting in Tunisia, what remained of the Division was just 50 men (without food and ammunitions) of the II battalion under captain Baldassari. Only one percent of the original combat force.
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".....General Messe accepted the task (of holding the Mareth line) though realising its arduous nature; and he left by air for Tunis. Once at his post, he spent the first few weeks in getting the troops into shape both materially and morally; they were, naturally, exhausted, either by their interminable retreat or by their long stay in African territory, a stay which for thousands of soldiers could be reckoned in terms of years. The fate of Tunisia was bound up with supplies. No fewer than three hundred thousand men were concentrated in a small space. The problem of organisation and supplies assumed disquieting dimensions. Naval losses were increasingly heavy. In April alone 120,000 tons of Italian shipping was sunk and a further 50,000 tons was damaged. While the enemy troops were more than well supplied, the Italo-German forces were threatened with mortal anemia.
When the first efforts of the German thrust were spent, having achieved nothing except an extension of the bridgehead, the English went over to the attack along the Mareth line.
In Rome the date of the attack was discussed, and it was thought that Montgomery would delay it in order to profit by the full moon as had been the case at El Alamein. Instead, the English general launched the attack on a pitch dark night. To prevent the artillery mowing down the infantry ahead of them, each soldier wore a white cloth on his back. The Mareth line was strong for some fifteen miles — from the sea to about half its length. The rest was weaker and the last sector almost non-existent; moreover, it was entrusted to the Saharan formations which had reached these positions after a highly exhausting march across the most remote desert trails. These formations, besides, had little artillery and lacked the necessary preparation for meeting the shock of mobile and armoured columns. The Italian troops entrenched on the Mareth line and protected by a broad anti-tank ditch resisted bravely and counter-attacked
Montgomery did not succeed in breaking through. Let us say frankly, too, because it is true, that in that sector the English were beaten.
Then the enemy switched his attack over to the weakest side, on the extreme right of Messe’s position, and there, profiting by an extensive use of armour, he had no difficulty in overcoming the Libyan forces and outflanking them. This forced General Messe to retreat some sixty-odd miles on a line running roughly halfway between the Mareth line and Tunis, Meanwhile, the Germans to the north-west were being hard-pressed by the Americans — here, also, with infinitely greater resources. Thus the circle contracted to the point of making further resistance impossible....Benito Mussolini"
I sent a letter in my own hand to Messe on April 14th, 1943, couched in these terms:
Then the enemy switched his attack over to the weakest side, on the extreme right of Messe’s position, and there, profiting by an extensive use of armour, he had no difficulty in overcoming the Libyan forces and outflanking them. This forced General Messe to retreat some sixty-odd miles on a line running roughly halfway between the Mareth line and Tunis, Meanwhile, the Germans to the north-west were being hard-pressed by the Americans — here, also, with infinitely greater resources. Thus the circle contracted to the point of making further resistance impossible....Benito Mussolini"
I sent a letter in my own hand to Messe on April 14th, 1943, couched in these terms:
Dear Messe,
Your report on the first victorious battle on the Mareth line is so vivid, thrilling and exhaustive that I have decided to make it known to the Italian people by having it printed. I have introduced merely a few alterations for comprehensible reasons. By this, and not only by this, I intend to give full recognition to your work as Commander and to the courage shown by your soldiers. Between the end of March and today the situation has changed, that is, has become more difficult. I wish to tell you that I count on you to protract resistance to the uttermost and thus upset the enemy plans, at least with regard to their time-table, which aim at a landing on the mainland, after a landing on the islands. Once again: we are doing and will continue to do the impossible to supply you with what you need.
My hearty good wishes and regards, as always,
MUSSOLINI.After the battle of the Mareth line, the second delaying battle in Tunisia took place, the battle of the so-called Shotts, a sort of salt marshes. Of this battle, too, Messe sent me a report accompanied by this note:
Duce,
I take the liberty of sending you, after the preceding report on the Mareth-El Hamma battle, the report of the battle of the Shotts, and the beginning of the difficult retreat on to the Enfidaville line. The report relates with perfect frankness the course of the bloody and violent struggle undergone and the extremely grave circumstances in which there occurred the disengagement of the large forces on the Shotts line and their retreat; also our very heavy losses, in virtue, chiefly, of the enemy superiority in the matter of armour and of artillery and, more particularly, in the air, where they had complete and unopposed mastery. But I can say that once again officers and men fought desperately and by their sacrifices did honour to our country’s flag.
The troops are physically very tired, and seriously diminished in numbers. The men fighting are, almost all of them, the same who retreated from Libya. But all my energy and all the energy of the various Commanders is being directed to helping and sup- porting these fine and heroic soldiers of ours, who are really working miracles. There has not been a single point at which the enemy has set foot inside our positions without our launching a fierce and violent counter-attack. ……. And I should like to tell you one thing more — that our troops at this time, compared with our allies (always first-class soldiers), have demonstrated greater willingness and momentum.
Owing to the very serious exhaustion of the troops, the inadequacy of artillery and ammunition and the almost complete lack of armoured vehicles, compared with the enemy’s crushing superiority in material, the situation is growing steadily graver. Our air force — and our ally’s as well — may be called non-existent, compared with the really overwhelming and intensively active enemy air force. In spite of all, you may be sure that the order to resist to the last will be faithfully carried out.
General MESSE.
The Battle of the Mareth Line was done by the British Eighth Army of General Montgomery in Tunisia, against the Mareth Line held by the Italo-German First Italian Army of General Giovanni Messe. It was the first big operation by the Eighth Army since the Second Battle of El Alameint, that happened in Egypt nearly 5 months previously. The "36th Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti" division was created in 1942, when fought bravely in Libya (Bir el Gobi) and Egypt (Siwa) : the division was in Tunisia in early 1943, after occupying the old Mareth defenses created by the French.
On late March 19, 1943, "Operation Pugilist" -the first British attack- established a bridgehead in the Mareth line but a break-out attempt was defeated on March 21/24 by Axis counter-attacks done mainly the 136th Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti and the XV Panzer Division of the German Wehrmacht.
As a consequente Montgomery did a few days later the "Operation Supercharge II", an outflanking manoeuvre via the Tebaga Gap on March 21 - 26: it was successfully and Messe was forced to writhdraw 64 km back in the Shott area of southern Tunisia.
The Battle of Mareth was preceded a few days before by the "Battle of Medenine", a small counterattack by the famous Rommel.This battle was unsuccessful and was the last done by the "desert fox" before returning to Germany.
After a full day of fighting, Rommel accepted a suggestion from Messe to end the attack, since it could not be continued without risking losses which would compromise the defence of the Mareth line
On March 19, 1943, XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) of the Eighth Army commenced "Operation Pugilist" (the British code name for the Mareth battle).
The First Italian Army had at its immediate disposal 56 tanks: 29 German and 27 Italian. The German Africa Korps, with the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions, and a total of 94 tanks, was in army group reserve. The 21st Panzer Division, which had been moved toward Mareth on 17-18 March to counterattack if necessary in conjunction with the 15th Panzer Division, was not expected to arrive in its assembly area before the morning of the 19th. On the coastal plain of Mareth, Messe had from northeast to southwest--the Italian XX Corps under Generale di Divisione Taddeo Orlando, including the 136th (Young Fascists) Division, commanded by Generale di Divisione Nino Sozzani and the 101st (Trieste) Division under Generale di Brigata Francesco La Ferla (the latter's sector embracing the village of Mareth).
Some 50,000 Germans and 35,000 Italians were in the First Italian Army, according to the highest Allied estimate. Montgomery had 125,000 soldiers -according to Major-General W. Stevens, with 1,481 guns to the Axis's 680, with 623 tanks to the Axis's 139 and with air strength of at least two to one.
According to historian George Howe- the Eighth Army of Montgomery entered the battle for the Mareth Line organized into two regular and one provisional corps: the main attack was to be delivered on a 1,200-yard front close to the seacoast (defended by the "Giovani Fascisti" division) by 30 Corps under General Leese. It would include the British 50th (Northumberland) and 51st (Highland) Divisions, 4th Indian Division, and British 201st Guards Brigade. The third major element of the army, 10 Corps, commanded by General Horrocks, consisted of the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions and 4th Light Armoured Brigade. It was to be held in reserve.
The British opened the main attack on the Mareth Line with an extremely heavy artillery preparation by over 300 guns in the evening of March 19. Howe estimated that 20,000 rounds fell in the Young Fascists sector, nearest the coast, and about 16,000 rounds in the 90th Light Africa Division's area farther west.
It was a clear defeat for Montgomery but his armament superiority soon changed the temporary tactical defeat in a victory, thanks to a flanking maneuver on the Tebaga Gap.
THE BATTLE
At 8.30 pm on March 19th, hell broke loose on the front with an initial terrible artillery bombing, like a replica of El Alamein. General Montgomery was aiming to close the conflict in north Africa by the end of the month. But in the next days he was forced to change his opinion, because of the desperate -and often suicidal- fightings done by Italian and German troops like the infantry division "Giovani fascisti" at the Mareth line. Suggestive names were chosen by general Messe for the Axis defense lines of the Mareth line (that has been created initially by the French in the late 1930s, against possible Italian attacks from Italian Tripolitania): "Biancospino", "Betulla"., "Tiglio", "Timo", etc... The "P2" stronghold was entrusted to the Xth/8th brigate; "Larice" ("P1") and "Tiglio" ("P1 bis") to the 11th/8th. While the LVIIth/8th brigate presided over the strongholds of "A1" and "A2". When the Montgomery attack started the bersaglieri of the 8th Regiment resisted, but two adjacent positions, "Betulla" and "Biancospino", held by 5 Companies of the German "Grenadiers of Africa" collapsed. So the British attackers could take the backside of the "Trifoglio" stronghold manned by the Xth, who was conquered after a furious struggle. The British then threw themselves on the stronghold of the 11th/8th, but the attempt was defeated. In the early dawn, the former Brigates of the 8th and 7th are given the task of attacking the "Betulla" stronghold, occupied by the British. Under the orders of Captain Givone, the fusiliers of the 1st and 2nd Companies, although subjected to three hours of intense artillery fire and mortars, launch themselves into the enemy trenches. Actors of heroic episodes are also two fusilier platoons of the 3rd Company, dragged to harsh combat by Lieutenant Guineani. On the late morning of the 22nd, after having overwhelmed the stronghold "Timo 2", the British attackers tried against the "Timo 1" defended by the "Giovani Fascisti". But t was rejected. On the same day the 15th German Armored Division counterattacked and the British were driven back from the strongholds "Betulla", "Trifoglio", "Tamarindo" and "Timo 2", while the "Biancospino" was reoccupied by the "Arditi" and "Young Fascists" soldiers on the day 24. On this important coastal sector, the reaction of Italian weapons -mainly from the Young Fascists" -opened up frightening voids in the British ranks, destroying numerous tanks and killing many British soldiers. It is noteworthy to pinpoint that Montgomery had 620 tanks attacking the Mareth line on the March 21, defended by only the remaining 94 tanks of Messe: even so the British were initially defeated in the northern coastal section of the Mareth line.
Following closely an artillery barrage, and led by "Scorpions" (tanks equipped with flailing chains on revolving drums to detonate enemy mines), the tanks of the armored column would carry fascines, ten feet long and eight feet in diameter, to make the wadi crossing and
He attributed to Rommel, who no longer was present in Africa since one week before, merits that belonged to others. Churchill was forced to admit the partial defeat and Montgomery asked him for two weeks of truce. The frightening struggle had lasted six days.
"Piled up the English corpses in front of our strongholds" was said by the "Giovani Fascisti" radiotelegraphists.
In these few days were annihilated famous British units, such as the "Brigade Guard", the. "Black Watch" and "Durham Light" of the 30 and 51 British Divisions. Furthermore were destroyed all the 50 tanks of the 23rd Armored Brigade of Montgomery.
General Messe, commenting on the English defeat, wrote: "...the Italian Divisions fought with great value and magnificent momentum, surpassing the Germans ... The action (counterattack of the German 15th Div.) could have had a very different ending if this unshakable barrier of support points had fallen into the hands of the enemy ... All Italian troops held a marvelous behavior, but a word of special praise goes to the heroic 8th Bersaglieri (of the 136th Armored Division) who surpassed himself ”.
And referring to the troop's behavior, he added: "During the furious British attack on the resistance position of the Division "Young Fascists ", epic episodes induced the Germanic liaison officer to signal the admiration of the German units who had witnessed it".
Inability to maintain the bridgehead, which British 30 Corps had gained during
the night of 20-21 March and to use it as a
base for a breakout to the rear of the Mareth Line defended by the Giovani Fascisti Division, forced General Montgomery to
adopt an alternative. "Operation PUGILIST" had gone awry: On March 26th, with some new armored forces arrived from Egypt, Montgomery managed to undermine the Mareth defense system conquering the Tebaga gap (Messe wrote ".. we are powerless, in front of the allied airplanes that " obscure the sun "... The territory we hold is like a drop falling on a table in the sun. It narrows as far as the eye can see.").
Nearly half of the soldiers in the "Giovani Fascisti" division were dead, missing in combat or wounded on March 27.
On March 28 the troops of the Italian 1st Army abandoned the -still holding & mostly unconquered- Mareth line and fell back on the Uadi Akarit line (north-west of Gabès, beyond the El Hamma strait) where most of the Italian-German troops have moved: the withdrawal was slow and orderly, in continuous fighting contact with the British attackers. The operations, conducted by Messe in person, were completed satisfactorily by the first days of April.
But the losses were very heavy for both sides. And while the British could replace the losses in their armaments, the Italian-German ones were reduced more and more every day without any possibility of receiving help.
COMMENTS
The sacrifice of the Giovani Fascisti division in Tunisia has been forgotten.
In two months of desperate & hopeless combat (from mid March to mid May 1943) the 5000 men of their Division suffered terrible losses and only 50 men remained when they surrendered in the area of Cape Bon/Enfidaville (they were the last soldiers of Messe to lower the Italian flag in north Africa in "Quota 141" - http://www.italia-rsi.it/primadell8sett/birelgobi/birelgobi0.htm). All the others were killed, missed in combat or wounded & made prisoners of war (POW) mainly in the battles of Mareth, Enfidaville and Cape Bon. The "damnatio memoriae" (the old roman way to erase the memory of those defeated) fell over their fightings: the Italian government never did a monument or ceremony to them and their British enemies simply gave all the merits to the Germans.
For example, we all know that Montgomery's memoirs are not accurate and are completely biased when minimising Italians efforts. In his memories, usually everytime something goes wrong for him, it’s always because of “Rommel” intervention or for Germans resistance. Italians for him were nearly always "losers".
Even at the Mareth line he wrote the same opinion– despite the fact it was Messe who engineered the resistance and directly commanded the counterattack of the German panzers, which were the only panzers left the 1st Italian Army had. Moreover, he seems to ignore that were the strongholds held by the Germans the ones that crashed down after the first punch given by the 50th English division: strongholds "Biancospino", "Bosso" & "Betulla” held by the Germans were overrun, while the strongholds “Larice" and "Trifoglio” held by Italians (Giovani Fascisti, X and XI Bersaglieri) resisted the strong initial attack.
Indeed the 21, after assessing that this was effectively the main attach, and after also the stronghold "Trifoglio" was overrun, Messe decided to commit the 15 Panzer Division as well as Italian infantry (Bersaglieri, Giovani Fascisti, Black Skirt and some German infantry – but minority in numbers) for a counterattack. Borowietz, commader of the 15 Panzer, was informed of the plan the 21. The successful counterattack was carried out effectively by Messe without any help by Rommel. Furthermore, Churchill at the House of Commons and the House of Lords declared on March 24: "The bridgehead constituted at the price of blood by the British 8th Army on enemy positions, has been eliminated by the Germanic counterattack". For the wounded English pride it was necessary to tell the world that the great British Army of Montgomery has not been defeated by the "weak" Italian soldiers but from the "Fox of the desert" (who no longer was in North Africa since March 8 and who they will continue to "materialize" in the battlefield). Indeed Rommel's army, renamed "1 Italian Army" , in early March 1943 was under General Messe. (He was not promoted Marshal until the last day of fighting in North Africa in May 1943).
This was the first time German divisions has come to be under orders of an Italian general.
Rommel's last act was to appoint a German general to be liaison officer with the "1 Italian Army"", the appointment being effective as from 8 March, which was a day or so before Rommel left North africa. His appointee was Major-General Bayerlein. Finally, its is important to pinpoint that the division "Giovani Fascisti" was made only by "voluntaries", in many cases university students (just 18/19 years old). They fought for their ideal of an Italian empire that could give to the Italians the prosperity enjoyed by the Italian peninsula during the centuries of the Roman empire. But History was not on their side, because one of the consequences of WW2 was the end of the colonial era. Indeed, their sacrifice was not totally worthless: they honored their country, even if British "propaganda" (like the one of Montgomery) was too much aggressive and unjust. Military Valor Medals given to the "Giovani Fascisti" Division during WW2(http://www.qattara.it/piccolacaprera_files/ggff.pdf): 2 Gold Medal of Military Valor 38 Silver Medal of Military Valor 61 Bronze Medal of Military Valor 116 War Cross of Military Valor
Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti:
(Data from website "Comando Supremo")
At 8.30 pm on March 19th, hell broke loose on the front with an initial terrible artillery bombing, like a replica of El Alamein. General Montgomery was aiming to close the conflict in north Africa by the end of the month. But in the next days he was forced to change his opinion, because of the desperate -and often suicidal- fightings done by Italian and German troops like the infantry division "Giovani fascisti" at the Mareth line. Suggestive names were chosen by general Messe for the Axis defense lines of the Mareth line (that has been created initially by the French in the late 1930s, against possible Italian attacks from Italian Tripolitania): "Biancospino", "Betulla"., "Tiglio", "Timo", etc... The "P2" stronghold was entrusted to the Xth/8th brigate; "Larice" ("P1") and "Tiglio" ("P1 bis") to the 11th/8th. While the LVIIth/8th brigate presided over the strongholds of "A1" and "A2". When the Montgomery attack started the bersaglieri of the 8th Regiment resisted, but two adjacent positions, "Betulla" and "Biancospino", held by 5 Companies of the German "Grenadiers of Africa" collapsed. So the British attackers could take the backside of the "Trifoglio" stronghold manned by the Xth, who was conquered after a furious struggle. The British then threw themselves on the stronghold of the 11th/8th, but the attempt was defeated. In the early dawn, the former Brigates of the 8th and 7th are given the task of attacking the "Betulla" stronghold, occupied by the British. Under the orders of Captain Givone, the fusiliers of the 1st and 2nd Companies, although subjected to three hours of intense artillery fire and mortars, launch themselves into the enemy trenches. Actors of heroic episodes are also two fusilier platoons of the 3rd Company, dragged to harsh combat by Lieutenant Guineani. On the late morning of the 22nd, after having overwhelmed the stronghold "Timo 2", the British attackers tried against the "Timo 1" defended by the "Giovani Fascisti". But t was rejected. On the same day the 15th German Armored Division counterattacked and the British were driven back from the strongholds "Betulla", "Trifoglio", "Tamarindo" and "Timo 2", while the "Biancospino" was reoccupied by the "Arditi" and "Young Fascists" soldiers on the day 24. On this important coastal sector, the reaction of Italian weapons -mainly from the Young Fascists" -opened up frightening voids in the British ranks, destroying numerous tanks and killing many British soldiers. It is noteworthy to pinpoint that Montgomery had 620 tanks attacking the Mareth line on the March 21, defended by only the remaining 94 tanks of Messe: even so the British were initially defeated in the northern coastal section of the Mareth line.
Indeed the Eighth Army assigned the attempt to punch through the final line to British 30 Corps. The 30 Corps assigned it to the British 50th Division, which gave the mission to the 151st Brigade and 50th Royal Tank Regiment (fifty-one tanks, of which eight had 6-pounder guns). The British 69th Brigade and a detachment of the 9th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, were expected
to clear a path to the Zigzaou wadi (defended by the "Giovani Fascisti") and to set up protection on the southwestern flank for the crossing of that barrier at three
points--one for each of two infantry battalions and one for the tanks.
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| An Allies "Scorpion" |
that of the steep-sided antitank ditch beyond it passable for the heavy vehicles. The infantry and tanks were to fan out on the far side in a bridgehead from which the enemy was to be cleared by battles at numerous strongpoints.
Severe difficulties impeded the first night's operations. The British force opened the path to the wadi and established the flank protection, but the Scorpions failed and the mines had to be more slowly removed by engineers using detectors. The British infantry crossed successfully but the tanks were delayed. Some of their fascines were ignited and had to be replaced from a stock farther to the rear. The Giovani Fascisti's fire was heavy and continuous and, near the wadi's edge, knocked out several tanks (see photo at bottom of article's comments).
For 3 days - 21, 22, 23 March - the hammering of the artillery and the impact of the armored vehicles were incessant against the Bersaglieri of the 8th brigade and the other "Young Fascists". However, repeated counterattacks of the LVII brigate (Mayor Bassi) succeeded in breaking every British attempt even at the strongholds “A1" and " A2", that were isolated & surrounded.
Like in El Alamein the vain initial efforts of Montgomery were increased tenfold from March 21st, while the New Zealanders were conquering the Tebaga Pass and there was the risk for the Italians & Germans of being circumvented.
Montgomery suffered serious losses; so much so that he was forced to erase his initial comments of easy victory, with the new messages he sent to London: these were very dramatic messages pinpointing a "firm, desperate resistance". (especially from the Germans of the V Army of Von Arnim, which still had efficient vehicles and was not on foot like the Italians of Messe).
Giovani Fascisti at Mareth
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| Map of the Mareth Battle (enlarge clicking on it) |
In two months of desperate & hopeless combat (from mid March to mid May 1943) the 5000 men of their Division suffered terrible losses and only 50 men remained when they surrendered in the area of Cape Bon/Enfidaville (they were the last soldiers of Messe to lower the Italian flag in north Africa in "Quota 141" - http://www.italia-rsi.it/primadell8sett/birelgobi/birelgobi0.htm). All the others were killed, missed in combat or wounded & made prisoners of war (POW) mainly in the battles of Mareth, Enfidaville and Cape Bon. The "damnatio memoriae" (the old roman way to erase the memory of those defeated) fell over their fightings: the Italian government never did a monument or ceremony to them and their British enemies simply gave all the merits to the Germans.
For example, we all know that Montgomery's memoirs are not accurate and are completely biased when minimising Italians efforts. In his memories, usually everytime something goes wrong for him, it’s always because of “Rommel” intervention or for Germans resistance. Italians for him were nearly always "losers".
Even at the Mareth line he wrote the same opinion– despite the fact it was Messe who engineered the resistance and directly commanded the counterattack of the German panzers, which were the only panzers left the 1st Italian Army had. Moreover, he seems to ignore that were the strongholds held by the Germans the ones that crashed down after the first punch given by the 50th English division: strongholds "Biancospino", "Bosso" & "Betulla” held by the Germans were overrun, while the strongholds “Larice" and "Trifoglio” held by Italians (Giovani Fascisti, X and XI Bersaglieri) resisted the strong initial attack.
Indeed the 21, after assessing that this was effectively the main attach, and after also the stronghold "Trifoglio" was overrun, Messe decided to commit the 15 Panzer Division as well as Italian infantry (Bersaglieri, Giovani Fascisti, Black Skirt and some German infantry – but minority in numbers) for a counterattack. Borowietz, commader of the 15 Panzer, was informed of the plan the 21. The successful counterattack was carried out effectively by Messe without any help by Rommel. Furthermore, Churchill at the House of Commons and the House of Lords declared on March 24: "The bridgehead constituted at the price of blood by the British 8th Army on enemy positions, has been eliminated by the Germanic counterattack". For the wounded English pride it was necessary to tell the world that the great British Army of Montgomery has not been defeated by the "weak" Italian soldiers but from the "Fox of the desert" (who no longer was in North Africa since March 8 and who they will continue to "materialize" in the battlefield). Indeed Rommel's army, renamed "1 Italian Army" , in early March 1943 was under General Messe. (He was not promoted Marshal until the last day of fighting in North Africa in May 1943).
This was the first time German divisions has come to be under orders of an Italian general.
Rommel's last act was to appoint a German general to be liaison officer with the "1 Italian Army"", the appointment being effective as from 8 March, which was a day or so before Rommel left North africa. His appointee was Major-General Bayerlein. Finally, its is important to pinpoint that the division "Giovani Fascisti" was made only by "voluntaries", in many cases university students (just 18/19 years old). They fought for their ideal of an Italian empire that could give to the Italians the prosperity enjoyed by the Italian peninsula during the centuries of the Roman empire. But History was not on their side, because one of the consequences of WW2 was the end of the colonial era. Indeed, their sacrifice was not totally worthless: they honored their country, even if British "propaganda" (like the one of Montgomery) was too much aggressive and unjust. Military Valor Medals given to the "Giovani Fascisti" Division during WW2(http://www.qattara.it/piccolacaprera_files/ggff.pdf): 2 Gold Medal of Military Valor 38 Silver Medal of Military Valor 61 Bronze Medal of Military Valor 116 War Cross of Military Valor
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| Photos of the Mareth battle. The first shows one of the British tanks destroyed by the Giovani Fascisti at the wadi ZigZoau |
Armoured Division Giovani Fascisti:
(Data from website "Comando Supremo")
Divisional HQ (from
136th GGFF REGIMENT
REGIMENTAL HQ (100 men)
1st GGFF Battalion
HQ (68 men)
3 COMPANIES, each with: (141 men)
COY HQ
1 RIFLE PLATOON (6 x LMG)
1 MG PLATOON (3 x MMG)
1 ATk PLATOON (3 x 20mm Breda L/65)
1 ATk PLATOON (3 x 47mm ATG)
2nd GGFF Battalion
Identical to 1st GGFF Battalion
? GaF Battalion
Organization not known (as above)
10th VOGHERA CCNN “M” Battalion
BTN HQ
RECON PLATOON
3 ASSAULT COMPANIES, each with:
COY HQ
3 RIFLE PLATOONS
1 MMG COMPANY
COY HQ
3 MMG PLATOONS (each 4 x MMG)
8th Bersaglieri Regiment
7th Bersaglieri Battalion
10th Bersaglieri Battalion
57th Bersaglieri ATk Battalion
9th Independent Infantry Battalion
Presumably the same as 1st GGFF Battalion.
? MG Battalion (details not known
? MG Battalion (details not known)
136th ARTILLERY REGIMENT
XIV AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 6517), 1 Section (2 x Cm 20/65)
XV AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 65/17), 1 Section (2 x Cm 20/65)
XVI AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 75/27)
XVII AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 100/17)
13th AUTOPORTATI AA BATTERY (4 x Cm 20/65)
3 MISCELLANEOUS ARTILLERY Gruppo
each with 75/27 Guns (12 each in theory) – Exact numbers not known
48th AA/ATk ARTILLERY Battalion (Italian 75/46 AA Guns)
88th ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY (8 x 20mm AA)
25th ENGINEER Battalion
BTN HQ
62nd Engineer Company
25th SIGNALS COMPANY
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136th GGFF REGIMENT
REGIMENTAL HQ (100 men)
1st GGFF Battalion
HQ (68 men)
3 COMPANIES, each with: (141 men)
COY HQ
1 RIFLE PLATOON (6 x LMG)
1 MG PLATOON (3 x MMG)
1 ATk PLATOON (3 x 20mm Breda L/65)
1 ATk PLATOON (3 x 47mm ATG)
2nd GGFF Battalion
Identical to 1st GGFF Battalion
? GaF Battalion
Organization not known (as above)
10th VOGHERA CCNN “M” Battalion
BTN HQ
RECON PLATOON
3 ASSAULT COMPANIES, each with:
COY HQ
3 RIFLE PLATOONS
1 MMG COMPANY
COY HQ
3 MMG PLATOONS (each 4 x MMG)
8th Bersaglieri Regiment
7th Bersaglieri Battalion
10th Bersaglieri Battalion
57th Bersaglieri ATk Battalion
9th Independent Infantry Battalion
Presumably the same as 1st GGFF Battalion.
? MG Battalion (details not known
? MG Battalion (details not known)
136th ARTILLERY REGIMENT
XIV AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 6517), 1 Section (2 x Cm 20/65)
XV AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 65/17), 1 Section (2 x Cm 20/65)
XVI AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 75/27)
XVII AUTOPORTATI Gruppo: 3 Bty (each 4 x Cm 100/17)
13th AUTOPORTATI AA BATTERY (4 x Cm 20/65)
3 MISCELLANEOUS ARTILLERY Gruppo
each with 75/27 Guns (12 each in theory) – Exact numbers not known
48th AA/ATk ARTILLERY Battalion (Italian 75/46 AA Guns)
88th ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY (8 x 20mm AA)
25th ENGINEER Battalion
BTN HQ
62nd Engineer Company
25th SIGNALS COMPANY
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(Same data, but in Italian language, from historian A.Cioci)
Reggimento fanteria "Giovani Fascisti"
COMBAT STRENGHTReggimento fanteria "Giovani Fascisti"
I Battaglione "Mi scaglio a ruina"
II Battaglione "Abbi fede"
8º Reggimento bersaglieri
V Battaglione bersaglieri motorizzato
XII Battaglione bersaglieri motorizzato
III Battaglione armi accompagnamento
IX Battaglione fanteria autonomo
136º Reggimento artiglieria
XIV Gruppo artiglieria su autocannoni da 65/17 su Morris CS8[13]
XV Gruppo artiglieria su autocannoni da 65/17 su Morris CS8
XVI Gruppo artiglieria su autocannoni da 75/27 su Fiat-SPA TL37[14]
XVII Gruppo artiglieria su autocannoni da 100/17 su Lancia 3Ro[15]
88ª Batteria artiglieria contraerea da 20/65 Mod. 35
III Gruppo squadroni corazzato "Cavalleggeri di Monferrato" su AB41
IV Battaglione controcarro autocarrato "Granatieri di Sardegna"
XXV Battaglione misto genio
Comandanti/Commanders (1942-1943)
General D. Ismaele Di Nisio
General D. Nino SozzaniOn the March 19, 1943 the Division was holding the Northern (Coastal) section of the Mareth Line and had a combat strength of 5000 men.
Two months later, when surrendering -on May 13- as the last Axis troops still fighting in Tunisia, what remained of the Division was just 50 men (without food and ammunitions) of the II battalion under captain Baldassari. Only one percent of the original combat force.
.
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| Giovani fascisti in battle |
